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Perceptions of politics: 
a South African case
Knut G. Nustad
Universitetet for Miljø og Biovitenskap, Ås
A maior parte das teorias sobre o político em África baseia-se, de uma maneira ou de outra,
sobre o pressuposto de uma distinção fundamental entre uma forma de dominação ocidental,
burocrática e formal, e uma dominação africana muito mais personalizada. Este artigo propõe-
se contribuir para o debate, examinando em detalhe concreto, num projecto de desenvolvimen-
to urbano em Durban/África do Sul, a interacção destes dois modos de compreender o políti-
co. A existência das duas lógicas é identificada no caso, senda o forma legal representada pela
organização encarregada de promover o desenvolvimento, e a forma personalizada pelas orga-
nizações comunitárias. Verifica-se, porém, que as duas concepções do político são menos dico-
tómicas do que parece à primeira vista. Com efeito, a introdução de relações patrimoniais foi
condicionada pelo quadro legal, e os recursos utilizados para estabelecer o podes dos líderes
comunitários foram postos à sua disposição pelo quadro legal. 
Most theories of politics in Africa rest in some way on the assumption of a fundamental
distinction between a western bureaucratic, legal form of domination, and an African domi-
nation that is much more personalised. This article sets out to contribute to the debate by
examining in concrete detail the interaction of these two understandings of politics in an
urban development project at Durban/South Africa. Both logics are identified in the case,
where the development organisation represents the legal form and community organisations
the personalised form. It appears however  that the two conceptions of politics are less dicho-
tomical than it first would seem. In fact, the patrimonial relations that were introduced were
conditioned by the legal framework, and the resources that went into establishing power as
community leaders were made available because of the legal framework.
La plupart des théories de la politique en Afrique se fondent d'une manière ou de l'autre
sur l'hypothèse d'une distinction fondamentale entre une forme de domination occidentale,
bureaucratique et formelle, et une domination africaine beaucoup plus personnalisée. Cet arti-
cle se prose de contribuer au débat en examinant en détail concret, dans un projet de dévelop-
pement urbain à Durban/Afrique du Sud, l'interaction de ces deux façons de comprendre le
politique. Les deux logiques y sont identifiées, la forme légale étant représentée par l'organisa-
tion chargée de promouvoir le développement et la forme personnalisée par les organisations
communautaires.  Il apparaît cependant que les deux conceptions du politique sont moins
dichotomiques qu'il ne semble à première vue. En fait, l'introduction de rapports patrimo-
niaux a été conditionné par le cadre légal, et les ressources utilisées pour établir le pouvoir des
leaders communautaires ont été mises à leur disposition par le cadre légal.
In some form or another, most theories of politics in Africa rest on theassumption of a fundamental distinction between a western bureau-
cratic, legal form of domination, and an African domination that is much more
personalised. How these elements, drawn from Weber’s ideal types of domina-
tion, are combined in these models differs widely. Chabal and Daloz (1999) list
the three dominant models of African politics in political science: the neo-patri-
monial approach stresses the state’s failure to operate on the formal level of
ensuing rule of law and the application of public policy. At the same time, the
approach sees the African state as substantial in that it constitutes the most
important arena for the establishment of patrimonial relations. What in an ideal
model of a western society would constitute a public sector, the neo-patrimoni-
al approach sees as an extension of the private. In contrast, the hybrid state
model, while not questioning the existence of privatised networks, explains the
current situation as the result of a mixture of pre-colonial forms and genuine
African political traditions. Lastly, the transplanted state perspective depicts
modern African states as neither hybrids nor modern, but as a radical altered
form. A political tradition that emerged in Europe, the state, when moved to a
completely different setting, changed its nature incisively. 
Against these three models Chabal and Daloz propose a fourth model, the
instrumentalisation of disorder. This model seeks to understand the way in
which the weak institutionalisation of the political order benefits political elites.
They argue that the predicament of contemporary political analyses of Africa
stem from the application of ideas about modernisation and politics derived
from a western experience of modernisation. Their point is that African political
actors draw on a register of resources that a western model of politics would see
as a mixture of traditional and modern. 
All these models in one way or another contrast Weber’s conception of tradi-
tional and legal domination, although Chabal and Daloz stress that this distinc-
tion might owe more the analytical models than to African realities. In this
paper, I want to contribute to the debate, not by proposing yet a new model of
African politics, but by examining in concrete detail the interaction of these two
understandings of politics in a South African case, located in Cato Crest. 
Chabal and Daloz explicitly leave South Africa out of the analysis, but as
Mamdani (1996) has demonstrated, there are good reasons for treating South
Africa not as an exception, but as a typical case of the colonial state, where the
population was divided into supposedly traditional subjects under traditional
rule, and citizens. The case in question is a South African development project,
where the developers sought to grant people’s rights to housing as citizens. In
the process, however, they had to negotiate with a community leadership that
operated according to another logic, that of personalised patron-client relations.
The paper examines the relationship between these two perceptions of the polit-
ical in some detail, before it returns to the question of the relationship between
the two forms of domination.
Cato Manor
The area in which Cato Crest is situated, Cato Manor, has been one of the
most violently contested urban areas in South Africa. It is a huge area of land
within five miles of the centre of Durban. Originally owned by a white landown-
er, George Christopher Cato, the land was partitioned in the 1930s and sold to
Indian workers who had completed their tenure as well as to other Indian immi-
grants (Edwards 1994). With the great influx into the city during the Second
World War, many of the Indian landowners sublet to black workers and the first
years after the war saw a vibrant mixed settlement emerging. 
All was not harmony however. Conflict between Indian landowners and
black tenants erupted into violent conflict in 1949 and set in motion plans to reg-
ulate the area for white occupation. Cato Manor fell prey to apartheid develop-
ment, and by the mid-1960s, all its inhabitants had been forcibly removed to the
new townships outside Durban. The destruction of Cato Manor, which affected
the lives of 120,000 people, came to epitomise the brutality of apartheid devel-
opment. 
After its black and Indian occupants were forcibly removed in the late 1950s
and early 1960s, Cato Manor was a wasteland for almost thirty years. Towards
the end of the 1980s, when it became increasingly clear that change in the polit-
ical regime was imminent, people began moving into Cato Manor, erecting
shacks well out of sight from the relatively affluent neighbouring suburbs of
Bellair, Manor Gardens, Sherwood and Westville. The influx of people contin-
ued, despite attempts by the authorities to halt it. In 1995 it was estimated that
more than twenty thousand people lived in the squatter settlement of Cato Crest
alone (Makhathini & Xaba, 1995). 
In an attempt to mobilise against the government’s demolition teams, the
squatters formed a neighbourhood association, of the type referred to in South
Africa as a civic. Besides the civic, other organisations also involved themselves
with the plight of the squatters, among them the Cato Manor Residents’
Association (CMRA), which represented the Indian landowners who had been
forcibly removed in the 1960s. Since 1979 they had successfully fought off
attempts to develop Cato Manor for white housing. The CMRA, together with
other organisations, established a Development Forum in 1992. In 1993, the
Forum launched the Cato Manor Development Association (CMDA), with a
mandate to guide the development of the whole of Cato Manor. 
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From the outset the CMDA set out to find alternatives to the top-down plan-
ning of the apartheid government. They chose a participatory approach which
entailed close collaboration with community structures, and which rested on an
assumption of the representativeness of these structures vis-à-vis the wider com-
munity. People were to be granted their rights as citizens of the new South
Africa, and the community structures were to function as intermediaries
between the citizens and the state, here represented by CMDA. The developers
sought, in other words, to act as an extension of the new democratic govern-
ment’s legal domination. But as we will see, this conception of politics came to
interact with another, personalised understanding of power and the political. 
Extending the rights of citizens
Any present-day development project in South Africa, and especially in Cato
Manor, takes of course place in the historical context of apartheid development
(Nustad 1996, 1999). As Murray and Williams (1994) have argued, a top-down
approach to development has been made impossible by the legacy of apartheid.
To succeed, the development of Cato Manor had to demonstrate that it consti-
tuted a break with top-down approaches. The ANC was favouring a bottom-up
approach to development in its «Reconstruction and Development Programme»
(ANC 1994), and to have any chances of success, the development of Cato
Manor had to be seen as a partnership between people living in the area and the
developers. 
The Cato Manor Development Association recognised that working in high-
ly politicised settings like Cato Crest would be extremely problematic, and
decided to postpone their involvement there. Instead they concentrated on the
empty spaces of land in Cato Manor. But their hands were forced: because of the
public outcry about land invasions, the CMDA had to start negotiations with the
local leadership in Cato Crest earlier than they had wished. It turned out to be
as difficult as they anticipated. People involved in the community structures in
Cato Crest were extremely distrustful of the CMDA. I was repeatedly told that
the CMDA could not possibly be interested in promoting development because
a developed Cato Crest would mean an end to their well-paid jobs. 
Already at this stage in the narrative it is apparent that there are two differ-
ent conceptions of politics at work. The developers wanted to structure their
task according to a legal perception of politics. They could not relate to the
whole mass of people in Cato Crest, and had to construct a segment of it, the
leadership, as representative of the rest. This formal understanding derives from
Weber’s notion of bureaucratic domination whereby an elected representative
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acts in accordance with the rules laid down and defined by his or her office. The
assumption in Cato Crest, then, was that local leadership would act as represent-
atives for the larger community. Already in the suspicion that the employees of
the CMDA were more interested in keeping their salaries than in providing
houses, a different perception of the process is evident. People in the local lead-
ership expected CMDA to mix up the personal and the official, and to act more
in accordance with the Weberian ideal type of traditional leaders. This, it turned
out, was how they themselves approached the task as representatives of Cato
Crest. 
Community politics
In this first period, the newly formed community organisation successfully
mobilised against outside attempts at expelling them. However, once the imme-
diate threat was gone, another, and more disruptive, power mechanism seems
to have underscored the actions of the local leadership. This mechanism is sim-
ilar to what Bayart (1993) and others have termed neo-patrimonialism. In order
to hold on to the power as community representatives, the local leaders had to
mobilise resources in some way, both to survive themselves and to be able to
build up a group of loyal followers. 
The first such instance that members of the community structures recounted
to me, and which drew the line between two antagonistic groups in the local
leadership, occurred when the community organisation managed to negotiate
the erection of stem pipes for water supply. It was decided that the community
organisation would be responsible for collecting payment and that Cato Manor
Residents Association would be the body formally responsible. This set-up
resulted in allegations of mismanagement of funds, and the community organi-
sation was divided into two factions accusing each other of bad management
and crimes. 
This incident defined two groups among the local leadership who continued
to fight for power throughout the period in which I followed the local political
scene. One aspect is worth noticing here. The water company was willing to
erect standpipes and give credit to the population in Cato Crest because the
members of the community organisation were perceived as representative of the
wider community. In other words, the space within which the personalised eco-
nomic activity of embezzlement took place was created by the formal legalistic
understanding of the water company. The company, if it was to extend its serv-
ices to the community, needed a representative, responsible body with which to
conduct business. 
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This example was relatively innocent, but the same mechanisms where
involved later with much graver consequences. Events took a dramatic turn in
mid-1993 when there was a huge influx of people into the Cato Crest as a result
of the pre-election violence in KwaZulu/Natal. In a few months, the population
increased from a few hundreds to more than twenty thousand. As the settlement
increased in size, it became the focus of targeted efforts of improvement. The
Cato Manor Development Association was established and given the sole
responsibility for coordinating development efforts in the area. 
There was a mismatch between a formal understanding of the local leader-
ship as representative of the local population, and the actual practice of the lead-
ership. The factions in the leadership that were established right from the start
continued to fight for the control over the positions as community representa-
tives in negotiations with outsiders. As a result, there were constant struggles
over the positions of the community organisations and the establishment of rival
organisations. 
Why was it so important to gain access to these positions? The obvious
answer is access to resources. Whereas for the developer, a community organi-
sation represents a manageable manifestation of «the community’, for people
living in the squatter settlement the organisation it represents a link to the world
of government and NGO funding and equipment. Such positions become
extremely valuable resources in themselves, resources that exist because of the
way the development process is structured. 
Converting a position in a community organisation into material gains and
power took a variety of forms. One group of strategies was to allocate jobs given
by the developers to dependants and followers; another to appropriate money
and equipment from development organisations. A third very common strategy
was the trading of registration numbers by people involved in the community
organisations. Regardless of whether they were private developers, local or pro-
vincial authorities, or NGOs, the external agents involved in Cato Crest have
been concerned with imposing some kind of order on the perceived chaos of the
settlement. Making plans for the area made it necessary for the planner to have
some control over those to be planned for. Two closely connected strategies of
formalisation were employed by the developers to achieve this. The first
involved the transformation of persons into objects in the form of numbers. This
was done through the allocation of registration numbers to the residents in the
area, with the aim of establishing the size of the population. The second strate-
gy entailed the extension of recognition of the right to stay, symbolised by the
registration number, on condition that the recipients managed to keep others
out. The idea, then, was that those given the right to stay would see it as in their
interest to keep other people out. This strategy would then stabilise the situation
and enable the planners to estimate the number of people to include in their
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plans. There were four different attempts at ordering Cato Crest in this way.
Each time new shacks were built, and when the number system lost all resem-
blance with the reality on the ground, the developers devised new formulae. 
These futile attempts to establish control underwent a transformation
through their application. The numbers, in themselves, became commodities
that obtained an exchange value. Ownership of a number not only gave freedom
from police harassment, but also had an additional potential value. If the devel-
opment of formal housing commenced, it guaranteed the number-holder a part
in that process, and eventually a formal house. While the trading of registration
numbers had taken place to a smaller degree when Cato Crest consisted of a
handful of houses, trade became organised after the mass influx of 1993. As part
of the agreement between the then active community organisation and the pro-
vincial authorities, the organisation was charged with controlling the influx of
people into the area. The civic initiated a system of «marshals», people who
were to allocate registration numbers to those already settled and make sure that
no one arrived after the cut-off date. This put the marshals in a position where
they had, on the one hand, a valuable commodity to offer (the number which
symbolised legality), and on the other hand a sanction; they had the power to
inform demolition teams from the provincial authority that a shack had been
erected after the cut-off date. The marshals were quick to exploit the opportuni-
ty opened to them; they approached people building shacks and told them that
they needed a registration number to stay. Prices for a number ranged from R
200 to R 500 (USD 37-95). The marshals could demand a relatively high price
because they had the sanction of informing the provincial authority that the
house was being built illegally and therefore had to be destroyed. 
An analysis of the problem
I spoke to the CMDA Chief Executive Officer (CEO) after competition
between the rival fractions had fuelled a taxi war that killed fourteen people and
destroyed all organised community politics1. He conceded that many of the
problems they had encountered were the result of struggles between different
factions of the leadership over positions of representation. He began his analy-
sis of Cato Crest, and of what he called the structural problems of the CMDA’s
position, by saying that the main problem was one of legitimacy. The CMDA
lacked the authority to make decisions about development that would be
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1 Interview, 26 October 1996. The interview was interesting; after answering my question at first in a defensive
manner, he turned the situation around by saying «now, let me ask you some questions about the situation». What
ensued was an extremely interesting conversation.
accepted by people in the area. There is always a question, he said, of whether
any other structure than an elected local government could have sufficient
authority and legitimacy to do that. 
The CEO said that he felt «played» by the different interest groups. His
description of the situation parallels my own. He saw the leadership in Cato
Crest as being in a position where they could only entrench their power bases
by being perceived as those who delivered the resources. Their power derived
from their ability to say that they were the people who had access to CMDA
resources, that the CMDA was working for them. This was, according to the
CEO, the situation that would have to change if the development of Cato Crest
was to succeed. There had to be a mental shift, whereby people saw themselves
as citizens with inalienable rights, rather than as the dependents of local strong-
men. The vehicle for this transformation could only be the newly elected local
government:
«The advent of democratic local government and metro government is a major water-
shed in one’s ability to deal with these issues. What is crucial I think is to integrate this;
is to treat the people, the individuals in Cato Crest, the shack-dwellers, as citizens, as cit-
izens of this city. And to, in a sense, to transfer that knowledge, that psychological shift
– that we are citizens – we don’t have to work through local power brokers, local war-
lords and other con artists. It is part of another culture really. As citizens we have rights,
and we have rights, and we have rights to access resources, the rights to be integrated
into the body politics, into the city. The medium for that ultimately, the legitimate lead-
ership, are the elected politicians. And I think we have started, we actually got a good
leadership»2.
The CEO went on to clarify the differences between the two forms of commu-
nity leadership: that which existed at the present and that which would have to
come into being:
«I think the elections throw up an opportunity, a real opportunity for legitimate
political leadership, with authority, with legitimate authority, to actually start to provide
a leadership that is abstracted from the immediate material struggles in the area, and to
start to draw those people into, lead those people into – I don’t know, I am not an anthro-
pologist – but [from a] very primitive form, to a another form of social organization, to
a more modern [form]»3.
Having made the distinction between the old and the new forms of leader-





«The leadership format has come from an environment where there is no government
and never has been a government really. Where people, and it emerged out of apartheid,
where people weren’t citizens, they didn’t have rights, they didn’t have potential access
to resources. So you had one particular mode that is inappropriate to a context where
they are recognized as citizens, where they do have rights, but they don’t know it. And
the only persons that can tell them that are the politicians …. Politicians will have to do
this, got to get the message to the people, right down to the grassroots, to each individ-
ual, to each household, that you are a citizen, you have a subsidy, you have other rights.
As politicians our responsibility is to make sure that those assets are available to you,
that you do have these assets. They are yours. And your local development committee ...
are not bringing you the resources, you have got them. They are the people to ensure that
you get the most out of your things. So you are no longer now dependant on those peo-
ple, you are entrusting your assets, ... the management of your assets, the articulation of
your assets, to the local development committee. They are there to ensure that the agent
bringing those assets utilize them to the most effective way possible. They are your rep-
resentatives, and you are investing your shares with them or you are entrusting your
shares with them .... There is a very big difference between that and some shack-lord say-
ing I am bringing you ... you don’t get access to those resources except through me»4.
According to the CEO, then, the development of Cato Crest can only succeed
once a change in the consciousness of the population has taken place. The peo-
ple of Cato Crest must begin to see themselves as citizens with inalienable rights
rather than as dependents of local strongmen. In this scenario the development
committee are there to look after the interests of the people, they are merely rep-
resentatives. 
The dichotomy that the CEO employs – the leadership as the guardians of
peoples’ already-existing rights versus the leadership as the supplier of resour-
ces – is similar to a distinction that Weber deployed when he characterized the
difference between two ideal types of domination: «traditional domination» and
«legal domination». By using Weber’s analytical tools the assumptions that the
CEO, and many others with him, base their argument on will be easier to
explore. What follows is not an attempt to force the reality of the development
of Cato Crest into a model constructed for the analysis of the Prussian state. But
by applying the tools that Weber developed to the two leadership models that
the CEO described – that which existed at the time and that which had to come
into being before any development could commence – the premises of participa-
tory development can be made apparent. 
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4 Ibidem.
Forms of domination
When Weber set out to investigate forms of power, domination, and legitima-
cy, he started by distinguishing between three «pure» or «ideal» types of domi-
nation: charismatic, traditional and legal. This typology was meant as an intel-
lectual apparatus for the investigation of concrete historical manifestations that
would, Weber stressed, always be a combination of the three types. His concern
with forms of legitimacy (the idea that justifies domination) did not imply that
he favoured an idealist explanation of domination. Rather, it was an important
element to be considered together with other elements: «Experience shows that in
no instance does domination voluntarily limit itself to the appeal to material or affectu-
al or ideal motives as a basis for its continuance. In addition every such system attempts
to establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy» (Weber 1968, 213). As Marx
also stressed in his earlier works (e.g. The German Ideology), these ideas are not
only a reflection of an underlying base, they have consequences in themselves.
Thus, Weber continues, «according to the kind of legitimacy which is claimed, the type
of obedience, the kind of administrative staff developed to guarantee it, and the mode of
exercising authority, will all differ fundamentally» (Weber 1968, 213). It is this inter-
dependence between forms of obedience, administration and type of authority
that I will draw upon to examine the CEO’s assumptions. 
According to Weber, a bureaucratic organization operating in a situation
where the rule of law prevails is governed by certain principles: 
«I. There is the principle of fixed and official jurisdictional areas, which are general-
ly ordered by rules, that is, by laws or administrative regulations. 
1. The regular activities required for the purposes of the bureaucratically governed
structure are distributed in a fixed way as official duties. 
2. The authority to give the commands required for the discharge of these duties is
distributed in a stable way and is strictly delimited by rules concerning the coercive
means … which may be placed at the disposal of officials.
3. Methodical provision is made for the regular and continuous fulfilment of these
duties and for the execution of the corresponding rights ...». (Weber 1995, 196).
Weber’s first criteria of «rational legal authority», then, are concerned with
the rule-bound administrator whose work is governed by impersonal criteria
and who has strictly defined authority and means of compulsion. All this serves
to separate the powers vested in the office from the person holding it at any
given time. Weber continues, «II. The principles of office hierarchy and of levels of
graded authority mean a firmly ordered system of super- and subordination in which
there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones. Such a system offers the gov-
erned the possibility of appealing the decision of a lower office to its higher authority, in
a definitely regulated manner …
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III. The management of the modern office is based upon written documents (‘the
files’), which are preserved in their original or draught form …. in general, bureaucracy
segregates official activity as something distinct from the sphere of private life. Public
monies and equipment are divorced from the private property of the official» (Weber
1995,197).
A further separation of person and position is described here. Not only is the
authority vested in the office strictly defined, but also the «means of administra-
tion» is strictly separated from personal property. Likewise, the office is subject
to checks in an administrative hierarchy and the person holding an office cannot
appropriate it. 
Contrast this with Weber’s description of the system of administration under
traditional or patrimonial rule: 
«The masters are designated according to traditional rules and are obeyed because of
their traditional status (Eigenwürde). This type of organized rule is, in the simplest
case, primarily based on personal loyalty which results from common upbringing. The
person exercising authority is not a “superior ”, but a personal master, his administra-
tive staff does not consist mainly of officials but of personal retainers, and the ruled are
not “members” of an association but are either his traditional “comrades”… or his “sub-
jects.” Personal loyalty, not the official’s impersonal duty, determines the relations of the
administrative staff to the master» (Weber 1968, 226-227).
Instead of an impersonal system, domination here is manifested through a
person. He derives his authority through personal loyalty rather than through
written laws. This has consequences for the type of administration that sustains
traditional domination:
«In place of a well-defined functional jurisdiction, there is a conflicting series of tasks
and powers which at first are assigned at the master’s discretion …. These competing
functions originate particularly in the competition for sources of income which are at the
disposal of the master himself and of his representatives» (Weber 1968, 229). 
A prerequisite for a bureaucratic organization is that it is conducted on a con-
tinuous basis, which means that it must be a full-time occupation. Combined
with the prerequisite that compensation must not be derived from the revenue
of the office, some other compensation must be sought. The bureaucratic alter-
native is to reward the official with a monthly allowance in money or kind.
Alternatively, if one sees the leadership in Cato Crest as politicians, Weber’s dis-
tinction between «living off» and «living for» politics could be applied. The
point is the same: the leadership in Cato Crest are expected to perform their
functions as politicians or bureaucrats without compensation. Their situation
resembles much more what Weber describes as non-bureaucratic administra-
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tions, which depends «upon the fact that those who outrank others in social,
economic, or honorific terms are associated in one way or another with the per-
formance of administrative functions. This usually means that the incumbent is
rewarded for his assumption of administrative duties by the economic exploita-
tion of his position, which he may also use for purposes of social prestige» (quot-
ed in Bendix 1960:423). This is an alternative description of the «corrupt» lead-
ership in Cato Crest. Indeed, it is an ethos which was explicitly expressed by
some among the Cato Crest leadership – one must help oneself while helping
others. Weber’s description of traditional domination is similar to the CEO’s
description of the current situation in Cato Crest, where the leadership is not
«abstracted from the immediate material struggles in the area’. 
Importance adhering to the person is another characteristic of the leadership
in Cato Crest which Weber defines as being contrary to a bureaucratic form of
domination. In patrimonialism the leader achieves great personal authority
whereas the bureaucratic leader has authority only through his or her office
(Weber 1995:198). Weber’s traditional ruler has to contend with the forces of
decentralization – the tendency for his subordinates to usurp his privilege in
their own names. Again, this is a process that has been evident in Cato Crest.
The various groups contesting for power have been centred on certain strong
individuals who have managed to command direct personal obedience. The two
main antagonistic groups arose after the break-up of one group, the first civic,
which was, in Weber’s terms, subject to the forces of decentralization. 
Forms and their relations
So far, what I have outlined is nothing more that the incongruence of two
perceptions of politics. The CMDA failed because they based their programme
on an understanding derived from Weber’s legal domination, where the people
in Cato Crest already were citizens with inalienable rights. In this scenario, the
community leadership were to act as the people’s elected representatives, con-
fined to mediating between the individual citizen and the state. Instead, the
community leadership acted as patrimonial leaders. The power of the leader-
ship in Cato Crest, then, parallels that which Weber described as «traditional
domination’. The CEO’s ideal, that the people see themselves as citizens and
their leadership as providers of inalienable rights, parallels Weber’s «legal dom-
ination’. The leadership, in this scenario, is based on bureaucratic principles
where the means are entrusted to them by the people or the people’s elected rep-
resentatives. The more interesting aspect of the case arises when it is subjected
to closer scrutiny. Then it appears that the two perceptions of politics were less
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dichotomical than it first would appear. In fact, the patrimonial relations that
were established were conditioned by the legal framework. The resources that
went into establishing power as community leaders were made available
because the developers interacted with the community leadership as if they
were legal representatives. 
The majority of the leadership in Cato Crest had no stable income and hence
they used their positions on the community structures for what they were
worth. Their activity followed the logic of Weber’s traditional leader. Positions
were used to build up contacts with the outside world and to create a following
of dependents inside Cato Crest. What emerges, then, is a picture of a situation
where people who were subjected to a legal domination managed to turn the
instruments of that subjection into resources in a patrimonial network. 
The conscious creativity involved in that translation was best expressed by
the first person I got to know in Cato Crest, who was assigned to me as an assist-
ant by the community organisation then in control. We were sharing a few beers,
the situation was still very new to me, and I asked him why he had become
involved in the community structures. «People who do the projects do not like
individuals’, he said. When I asked him what he meant, he explained that if he,
as a black person, wanted to do something for himself, he could not just go to
the NGOs and ask for money or support. «The people who do the projects»
think of the black man as a group. In effect, membership of one of the commu-
nity organisations was the only way to access beneficiary organisations.
In most cases, the linking together of these two political forms were straight-
forward, as when the community leadership appropriated resources earmarked
for community development. More theoretically significant is the case of the
housing numbers, where the same object, numbers, were able to achieve totally
opposite functions within the two forms. Conceived to order the social field so
as to guarantee the citizens their inalienable rights in an as effective way as pos-
sible, the numbers were transformed to become valuable resources in the patri-
monial network. 
This takes us back the models that political scientists use to make sense of
politics in Africa. The case strengthens Chabal and Daloz’s point that contempo-
rary politics draws on a wide spectre of resources that cut across scientific cate-
gorisations. In addition, it demonstrates that different political forms can be both
in conflict and function syncretically depending on the perspective from which
it is viewed. From the point of view of the CMDA, the politics of the local lead-
ership must appear as an alien form, as disruptive to what it set out to do. But
from the point of view of the local leadership, the legal bureaucratic conception
of politics opened up a space for a different politics. This should caution us
about operating with too rigid conceptual boundaries between different forms
of politics. As the example from Cato Crest demonstrates, different political
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form can be dependant on each other, and be linked in creative ways by the peo-
ple who are attempted subjected to them. 
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